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Abstract
In this paper we examine the trade off between different effects of the availabil-
ity of venture capital on the speed of technological progress in an industry. We
consider an evolutionary industry simulation model based on Nelson and Winter
(1982) where R&D efforts of an incumbent firm generate technological know-how
embodied in key R&D employees, who might use this know-how to found a spinoff
of the incumbent. Venture capital is needed to finance a spinoff, and therefore the
expected profits from founding a spinoff depend on how easily venture capital can
be acquired. Accordingly, thick venture capital markets might have two opposing
effects. First, incentives of firms to invest in R&D might be reduced and, second, if
spinoff formation results in technological spillovers between the parent firm and the
spinoffs, the generation of spinoff firms might positively influence the future effi-
ciency of the incumbent’s innovation efforts. We study how this tradeoff influences
the effect of venture capital on the innovation expenditures, speed of technolog-
ical change and the evolution of industry concentration in several scenarios with
different industry characteristics.
Keywords: Venture Capital, Technological Progress, R&D Effort, Spinoff, Indus-
try Evolution
1 Introduction
It is well established that economic growth is to a considerable extent driven by techno-
logical change and therefore understanding the impact of economic factors on the speed
of technological change is important to characterize the factors that foster economic
growth. Attempts to characterize such factors can be made at different levels of aggre-
gation (firm-level, industry-level, macroeconomic level). Much work has focused on the
industry level studying patterns of co-evolution of industry structure, product range
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and employed technology (e.g. Dosi et al. (1995), Klepper (1996), Malerba and Ors-
enigo (1996)). The evolution of many industries is characterized by the emergence of a
few local agglomerations of producers, where a main mechanism driving such an evolu-
tion is the entry of start-up firms founded by former high-level employees of incumbent
firms (see e.g. Dorfmann (1983), Dahl et al. (2003), Klepper (2004)). Following Klepper
(2001) we refer to such entrants as spinoff firms. Spinoffs have a strong tendency to
locate close to the parent firm (see e.g. Sorenson (2003)) and accordingly sequences of
spinoff formations yields the generation of geographically concentrated firm clusters.
Furthermore, generation of spinoffs by key employees of incumbents is an important
channel of knowledge diffusion. Due to the increased diversity in the industry generated
by spinoff entries and the intensive knowledge flows between firms in local clusters, such
agglomerations have positive impact on the speed of technological change.
Founding a start-up company requires in addition to industry-relevant know-how
also financial resources. Due to the risky nature of start-up enterprises venture capital
plays a key role for financing spinoff companies. Based on a large a data set of venture
capital backed start-up companies Gompers et al. (2003) observe that about 45% of
these enterprises were spinoffs of public companies. They also show that firms that had
been backed by venture capital themselves are more likely to spawn a venture-capital
backed spinoff than companies who did not rely on venture capital. Accordingly, the
availability of venture capital in a certain region is an important factor to facilitate
the founding of spinoffs of local incumbents and the generation of a local agglomer-
ation of firms. In addition to the positive effect of the emergence of agglomerations
for technological change the inflow of venture capital into the industry should have
a positive impact by itself, since additional resources become available to be spent on
R&D and innovation related activities. There is empirical evidence that venture capital
investments and also the availability of venture capital is not uniform across regions
(see e.g. Sorenson and Stuart (2001) or Botazzi et al. (2004)) and therefore availabil-
ity of venture capital is an indicator for the economic conditions in a given region.
Following the line of reasoning sketched above, easy availability of venture capital is
generally considered as an important factor facilitating innovative activity in a region
and technological change1.
From the point of view of the parent company the foundation of a spinoff however
has at least two negative implications. First, key employees leave the company, reducing
the stock of know how embedded in the company2. Second, the spinoff is an additional
competitor with a high level of know-how the generation of which has been financed
by the parent company. This suggests that, at least if short run effects are considered,
parent firms have incentives to keep the key personnel within the firm by offering
additional remuneration for these employees. The better the outside option for the
potential spinoff founders, the higher is the additional remuneration needed to keep
the employee in the firm and the larger is the danger that the spinoff will actually be
founded. Accordingly, incentives for firms to invest in order to generate know-how to
be embedded in their key employees become smaller the easier potential entrepreneurs
1Amount of early stage venture financing is for example one of the key indicators in the country
reports of the European Innovation Scoreboard published annually by the European Commission.
2Phillips (2002) uses data from Silicon Valley law firms to show that a ’parenting event’ reduces the
life chances for the parent firm.
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can access venture capital financing3. On the other hand, in the medium and long run
the incumbent firm might profit from the existence of a local cluster and the knowledge
externalities generated by activities of the other cluster firms. This is particularly true
if main competitors of the firm are located in distinct regions or firm clusters.
The aim of this paper is, to shed more light on the trade-off between the direct and
strategic effects described above and to study the influence of the availability of venture
capital on incumbent firms’ choices of R&D effort and on the evolution of technology
and structure of an industry. Clearly, the type of dependency between availability
of venture capital and industry evolution might crucially depend on specifics of the
industry like the properties of the production technology, demand conditions, degree
of knowledge orientation or intensity of knowledge exchange between producers. In
order to distinguish between different types of industries we will consider two key
aspects. First, the intensity of technological spillovers between firms in the industry
that are located in the same geographical region. Second, the degree of advantages
on the market established firms have compared to new entrants. To capture such
advantages we consider learning curve effects. Marginal production costs are assumed
to decrease as accumulated past output of the firm increases. We are aware that a
classification of industries along these two dimensions is overly simplistic, but, given
that these are very basic properties of the industry, we believe that considering these
two dimensions allows for general insights into the main mechanisms responsible for the
effects of venture capital availability on the speed of technological change. The main
questions we address are:
• For what kind of industries does improved availability of venture capital increase
the speed of technological change?
• For what kind of industries does improved availability of venture capital lead to
higher firm expenditures for innovative activities?
• What is the impact of improved availability of venture capital on the dynamics
of industry concentration and industry profits?
Since local availability of venture capital is often formulated as an economic policy goal,
gaining insights into these issues also has clear implications for the design of innovation
policy and competition policy.
In order to deal with the questions posed above we consider a dynamic agent-based
industry simulation model that builds on the evolutionary model of Schumpeterian
competition described in Nelson and Winter (1982). Variations of that model have been
used in the past to study numerous aspects of industry evolution, see Dawid (2006)
for a discussion of that stream of literature. In our setup an industry is considered
3There is some theoretical work on the effect of the threat of outgoing technological spillovers due to
employee mobility on firms innovative efforts. Starting with Pakes and Nitzan (1983) different aspects
of the optimal design of contracts for key R&D employees under the threat of exit of that personnel has
been studied (e.g. Anand and Galetovic (2000), Baccara and Razin (2004)). Gersbach and Schmutzler
(2003) show in a static game theoretic model that potential worker mobility indeed has negative effects
on equilibrium investments in innovative activities and Bo¨hm and Colombo (2006) point out that in
a general equilibrium framework potential worker mobility discourages adoption of better technologies
by the incumbent firms.
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where firms located in several distinct industrial clusters produce with heterogenous
technologies for a common market. Initially there is one firm in each cluster, additional
firms might enter if spinoffs emerge from an existing firm in the cluster. There are
technological spillovers within each cluster but none between the different clusters.
Each firm can make investments for (process) innovation to generate new knowledge
and improve its productivity. Productivity can also be improved by imitation of more
productive competitors. Knowledge generated by innovative activities is assumed to
be embodied in a key employee4 and if the innovation is sufficiently substantial the
latter considers to found a spinoff that will then compete in the market based on that
innovation. In order to do so, however, she needs venture capital. The easier it is
to raise this capital the larger is the fraction of market profits of the new firm that
can be attained by the spinoff founder. If the employee leaves the parent firm, only
a fraction of the knowledge generated through the firms innovative activities remains
with the incumbent, which would then suffer a reduction in productivity and profits.
The parent firm can try to prevent the key employee from founding a spinoff by offering
her a wage increase. The size of the offered wage premium and the employees decisions
whether to accept it depends on the estimated profits of both sides in case a spinoff is
formed and therefore on the costs for the employee associated with raising the necessary
venture capital. Estimations of profits after spinoff formation are based on observations
following previous spinoff entries.
Firms over time adapt their decisions concerning expenditures for innovation and
imitation based on the comparison of the productivity gain per unit spent for the two
activities in the past. This simple learning rule of reinforcement type allows to capture
the potential negative effect of availability of venture capital on firms incentives to
invest in innovative activities. Firms exhibit no strategic behavior in a game-theoretic
sense but act strictly rule-based. Nevertheless, this type of model allows us to examine
in a dynamic framework the tradeoff between the static and inter-temporal incentive
effects as well as the dynamic externalities due to cluster emergence induced by the
availability of venture capital.
In this paper we restrict the role of venture capital to providing necessary financial
means for spinoff generation. This simplification ignores several other influences of ven-
ture capital financing like the facilitation of professionalization measures (see Hellman
and Puri (2002)), which could influence relative performance if we considered scenarios
where only a fraction of startups is financed by venture capital. In our model all new
entries are financed by venture capital and we do not have to consider such effects. On
the other hand, the results we obtain concerning the effect of improved availability of
venture capital would also apply to the improvement of any other local resource that
facilitates the generation of spinoffs.
In a related paper Colombo and Dawid (2006) have analyzed the impact of availabil-
ity of venture capital on innovative activities of incumbents in a static game-theoretic
framework focusing on the interaction between one incumbent and one potential spinoff
founder. Due to the static nature of their analysis neither inter-temporal effects of clus-
ter formation nor learning curve effects have a role, but the model is very similar to
the one considered here with respect to the structure of the negotiations between the
4This could also be a group of senior employees that considers to leave the firm in order to found a
spinoff.
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incumbent and its key employee. A main finding in Colombo and Dawid (2006) is
that higher availability of venture capital has negative effects on incumbents’ R&D
expenditures as long as the venture capital market is relatively thin, but this negative
effect disappears as access to venture capital becomes very easy. The analysis in this
paper allows us to see in how far these findings are qualitatively robust with respect
to relaxed assumptions of rationality of firms and individuals and with respect to a
dynamic perspective. This will be done by comparing the insights from Colombo and
Dawid (2006) with the qualitative features of the simulation results for a baseline case
where neither spillovers nor learning curve effects are present.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the agent-based simula-
tion model. Simulation results are presented in section 3, where we distinguish between
four different cases based on presence or absence of spillovers and learning curve effects.
Concluding remarks are given in section 4.
2 The Model
We consider a dynamic industry model that is based on the evolutionary model of
Schumpeterian competition developed by Nelson and Winter (see Nelson and Winter
(1982)). Using this kind of model implies that we abstract from product innovations and
restrict attention to productivity increasing process innovations. This focus is certainly
debatable, in particular because the motivation for a large fraction of spinoffs is the
production of a new product not offered by the parent. On the other hand, the main
competition effect we like to capture – spinoff generation reduces the incumbents profit
in the short run – is captured in this formulation and dealing with product innovations
would require to consider a substantially more involved demand structure and more
refined innovation strategies.
2.1 Production and Technical Change
The industry consists of Nt producers which all offer a homogenous good. Time is
discrete and the number of producers might change over time due to the creation of
new firms (see below).
As in Nelson and Winter (1982) we assume that each firm produces with constant
returns to scale and fixed input coefficients, where the output quantity is determined
by size and productivity of the current capital stock. The output of firm i in period t
therefore reads
Qit = KitAit,
where Kit ≥ 0 denotes the size of the capital stock of firm i at t and the productivity
of capital, Ait > 0, is determined by the technology currently used by firm i. The
total output Qt =
∑Nt
i=1Qit induces the market price by the iso-elastic inverse demand
function
pt = p(Qt) :=
α
Qt
, α > 0.
Production costs are given by CitKit, where
Cit = (1− η)nitc
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with η ∈ [0, 1), c > 0 and
nit =
ln
(∑t
s=1Qis
)
ln(2)
.
The corresponding unit costs read CitKitQit =
(1−η)nitβ
Ait
. For η > 0 there are learning-
curve effects that imply that every doubling of aggregate output leads to the reduction
of unit costs of production by the factor 1 − η. Such learning curve effects might be
driven by a reduction of the amount of complementary input factors (e.g. labor) that is
needed per unit of capital. As pointed out in the introduction, the existence of learning
curve effect is considered as a proxy for more general market advantages for incumbents
compared to new entrants. Apart from learning curve effects such advantages might for
example be due to advantageous conditions with suppliers or distributors, scale effects
or consumer loyalty.
Firms can improve the productivity of capital by means of innovation or imitation.
We denote byXimit firm i’s expenditures per unit of capital for imitation efforts in period
t and by Xinit expenditures per capital for innovation. Both types of efforts are assumed
to have uncertain success, where the probabilities for successful imitation respectively
innovation are given by
IP(Imit = 1) = aimXimit Kit
IP(Init = 1) = ainXinit Kit + Yit.
Here Imit and Init are binary variables indicating the success of firm i’s efforts in period
t and aim, ain > 0 are sufficiently small to keep the expressions for the success proba-
bilities in the unit interval. The term Yit captures incoming technological spillovers for
firm i. We assume that a firm can obtain spillovers only from competitors in its own
industrial cluster. The cluster of firm i, denoted by Cit, consists of all firms that are
either direct or indirect parents or direct or indirect spinoffs of firm i (see below). The
size of the spillovers depends on the innovation efforts of all other firms in the cluster
with an upper bound given by β > 0. In particular, we have
Yit = min
β, β ain ∑
j∈Cit\{i}
XinjtKjt
 .
As in Nelson and Winter (1982), successful imitation means that firm i adopts the
best technology that is currently used in the industry, whereas the productivity of a
new technology stemming from a successful innovation is a stochastic variable with
expected value equal to the firm’s current productivity. We denote the productivity
resulting from successful imitation by A¯t = max[Ait|i = 1, . . . , Nt]. The productivity of
the new technology arising from a successful innovation is denoted by A˜i,t and follows
a Gaussian distribution with mean Ai,t and variance σ2.
2.2 Radical Innovations and Potential Spinoff Formation
If a successful innovation effort of a firm leads to an improved productivity A˜it > A¯t+ν
for a given ν > 0 we call this a radical technological innovation. In such a case the key
R&D personnel of the firm considers to use the acquired knowledge in order to found
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a separate producing firm. If such a spinoff is indeed generated, the new firm j enters
the industry with Kj,t = Kini and productivity of capital of Aj,t+1 = A˜it. In such a
case the parent company looses the tacit knowledge of the leaving R&D personnel and
therefore cannot fully exploit the newly developed technology. Productivity of capital
only increases to the level
Ai,t+1 = Aˆi,t := Ait + µ(A˜it −Ait).
On the other hand, if no spinoff is formed – which is always true if innovation activities
are not successful or the innovation is not radical – the productivity of firm i in the
following periods is given by
Ai,t+1 = max[Ait, ImitA¯t, InitA˜it].
Spinoffs are financed by venture capital, which means that for the first τ periods of
existence the newly founded firm is not subject to any financial constraints on invest-
ments. Founders of the spinoff and venture capitalists split the profits of the new firm,
where a fraction γ of profits goes to the founders. The parameter γ is a proxy for the
bargaining power of the potential spinoff founders when negotiating with the venture
capitalists. The larger the supply of venture capital on the market the larger should
the bargaining power of the spinoff founder be. A scenario with few sources for venture
capital accordingly corresponds to a small value of γ, whereas a large γ corresponds to
a thick venture capital market. The spinoff firm is added to the cluster of the parent
firm which is now also the cluster of the spinoff firm.
In order to prevent their R&D personnel from forming a spinoff the mother company
can offer additional bonus payments. The size of this bonus is determined by bilateral
bargaining, where the disagreement payoff for the employees is given by their share of
estimated future profits if the spinoff is formed, and the disagreement payoff for the
firm is given by its expected profit\losses in case the spinoff enters the market. In
particular, denote by p¯iSp(t) the average per period profit per unit of capital in the
time interval [t − η, t − 1] made by all spinoffs that have been in existence for more
than τ periods. Furthermore, denote by K¯t the average capital stock of all firms in
period t. The potential spinoff founder estimate the per period profit potential of their
spinoff, once it is established, as p¯iSp(t)K¯t and therefore estimate their payoffs in case
of disagreement as
bmin = γp¯iSp(t)K¯t.
They will not accept any bonus below this level. On the other hand, the firm estimates
its next period profits in case a spinoff respectively no spinoff is formed as
pˆiSpit = (p(Q−i,t +KitAˆit)Aˆit − CˆSpi,t+1 −Ximi,t+1 −Xini,t+1)Ki,t+1
pˆiNSpit = (p(Q−i,t +KitA˜it)A˜it − CˆNSpi,t+1 −Ximi,t+1 −Xini,t+1)Ki,t+1,
where the estimated per capital costs of production CˆSpi,t+1, Cˆ
NSp
i,t+1 in general differ be-
cause of the differences in learning curve effects induced by different output quantities.
The maximal bonus the firm would be willing to accept is
bmax = pˆi
Sp
it − pˆiNSpit .
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If we assume that the actual bonus is determined by the Nash Bargaining solution of
this bargaining problem with bargaining power ξ for the firm, we obtain that a spinoff
is formed whenever bmin > bmax. If bmin ≤ bmax no spinoff is formed and the bonus
reads
bit+s = ξbmin + (1− ξ)bmax, ξ ∈ [0, 1] s = 1, . . . d.
The firm commits to pay this bonus to the R&D employees each period from t+ 1 to
t+ d.
2.3 Capital Accumulation, Savings and External Financing
Profits per unit of capital are denoted by piit and read
piit = ptAit − Cit −Ximit −Xinit − bi,t.
Bit captures special bonus payments the firm might have to pay in order to keep their
key R&D manager within the firm. Details concerning Bit are discussed. In case
profits are positive a fraction λ is distributed as dividends. Not distributed profits net
of investments are saved. Denoting investments by Iit and firm savings by Sit we have
Sit =
{
Si,t−1 + (1− λ)piit − Iit piit ≥ 0
Si,t−1 + piit − Iit piit < 0.
Capital is assumed to depreciate at a rate δ > 0 for all firms, i.e.
Ki,t+1 = (1− δ)Kit + IitKit.
Investment of firms is determined on the one hand by the their intended investment
pattern and, on the other hand, by financial constraints. The intended investment per
unit of capital of firm i is given by
Iˆit = max
[
0, δ + 1− 2−MSit
2PCit(1−MSit)
]
,
whereMSit = Qit/
∑Nt
j=1Qjt denotes the market share of firm i and PCit = (ptAit)/Cit
the price-cost ratio. The reader is referred to Nelson and Winter (1982) for a discussion
of the rationale underlying this particular form of the intended investment function.
All firms other than startups financed by venture capital finance investments by profits
plus savings. If a firm cannot cover the intended net investments by profits plus savings
it can however obtain external financing as long as profits are positive. Hence, financial
constraints for investments are given by
f(piit) =
{
Sit + δ + piit piit < 0
Sit + δ + 3.5piit piit ≥ 0.
and actual investments read
Iit = min[Iˆit, f(piit)].
Financial constraints for investments are never binding for the first τ periods of oper-
ation of spinoff companies that are financed by venture capital. In these cases we have
Iit = Iˆit.
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2.4 Adaptation of Strategies
Firms adapt over time their strategies concerning investments for imitative and inno-
vative activities. The spirit of the used adaptation rule is similar to reinforcement-
learning. A firm updates Ximit and X
in
it after every period where it had either a suc-
cessful imitation or innovation based on the relative average returns on the two types
of investment. We denote by ∆init and ∆
im
it the estimates of firm i of the returns on
investment for innovation and imitation investments. These estimates stay unchanged
from one period to the next if the corresponding activity had no success in that pe-
riod. Assume that firm i had a successful innovation in period t− 1 and that the last
successful innovation before that was in period t− k. Then, based on a comparison of
the profitability of the innovation and the total investments needed to generate it, the
estimated return on investment for innovations is updated to
∆init =
(Ait −Ai,t−1)pt − bit∑t−1
s=t−k+1X
in
it
.
Analogously, if a successful imitation occurred in t − 1 the return on investment for
imitation is updated to
∆imit =
(Ait −Ai,t−1)pt∑t−1
s=t−k+1X
im
it
.
If an innovation or imitation occurred in t − 1 the firm compares the the updated
return on investment with that of the competing activity. The investments for the
activity with the higher estimated return are increased by a given percentage, whereas
investments for the activity with the lower estimated return are reduced. We have
Xini,t+1 = (1− ²)Xinit
Ximi,t+1 = (1 + ²)X
im
it
}
∆init < ∆
im
it
Xini,t+1 = (1 + ²)X
in
it
Ximi,t+1 = (1− ²)Ximit
}
∆init > ∆
im
it .
In figure 1 we give an overview over the sequence of activities in a given period t.
3 Results
3.1 Simulation Setup
All reported results are based on batches of 50 simulation runs with T = 200 periods
for each parameter constellation. To check whether a change in the parameter setting
has significant effects on the means over the 50 runs of some considered variables,
we have backed our qualitative statements with Wilcoxon signed rank tests typically
using a significance level of 0.95. In particular, all qualitative statements concerning
monotonicity of productivity with respect to γ have been confirmed using a Wilcoxon
test to compare scenarios with γ = 0 and γ = 1. The main focus of our analysis is
on the interplay of the parameters γ indicating the availability of venture capital, η
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Figure 1: Sequence of events in a given period t
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determining the strength of the learning curve effect and the spillover intensity β. The
default parameter setting for the other model parameters is given by
α = 100 aim = 0.125 ain = 0.125
c = 0.16 σ = 0.02 λ = 0.2
² = 0.1 δ = 0.03 ν = 0.02
µ = 0 ξ = 0.5 τ = 10
d = 10 Ximi0 = 0.005 X
in
i0 = 0.005
Ki0 = 89.7 Kini = 10
Changes in these parameters have been considered and did not result in qualitative
changes of the obtained insights. As far as technological spillovers and learning curve
effects go, we consider four scenarios: i) neither effect is present; ii) positive learning
curve effects, no spillovers; iii) positive spillovers, no learning curve effects; iv) both
effects are present. In consideration of the main questions posed in the introduction we
report for each of the four scenarios the impact of the availability of venture capital on
several key variables:
• average productivity at T : A(t) =∑Nti=1 KitKcumt Ait
• average innovation and imitation investments at T : Xim(t) = ∑Nti=1 KitKcumt Ximit ,
Xint =
∑Nt
i=1
Kit
Kcumt
Xinit ;
• average firm profits at T : Π(t) =∑Nti=1 KitKcumt piitKit
• industry concentration (Herfindahl Index) at T : HH(t) =∑Nti=1 ( QitQcumt )2,
where Kcumt and Q
cum
t denote total capital stock respectively total output in the in-
dustry at time t.
3.2 The Baseline Case
Let us first consider the scenario without knowledge externalities within a cluster and
without learning curve effects. Both of these effects are of genuine dynamic nature and
therefore have not been considered in the static game-theoretic analysis in Colombo
and Dawid (2006). Before we systematically examine the impact of an increase in γ
on the state of the industry after T = 200 periods, we illustrate in figure 2 some basic
pattern of the dynamics arising in the model. In particular, we show the trajectories of
productivity and market share of all firms for one example of a run with low availability
(γ = 0.25) and one example of a run with high availability (γ = 0.75) of venture capital.
The trajectories of all firms belonging to the same cluster are depicted in the same color.
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Figure 2: Trajectories of firms’ productivity and market shares for a single run (β =
η = 0) with γ = 0.75 (panels (a) and (c)) and with γ = 0.25 (panels (b) and (d))
Several observations can be made at this point. As far as the evolution of pro-
ductivity goes, the observed pattern of small stepwise technological improvements by
single firms with relatively fast imitation by the competitors is quite familiar from pre-
vious analyses of Nelson-Winter type models. With the exception of a few laggards the
variance of the productivity of firms stays small. As has to be expected, the number of
spinoffs is larger in the case where venture capital is more readily available. Considering
market-shares it can be seen that spinoffs quickly acquire substantial market shares and
are able to keep these shares after the venture capital financing expires. Furthermore,
a clear negative effect on the market share of the mother firm of the spinoff can be seen
such that the positive effect of the foundation of a spinoff on the total market share of
all firms in that cluster is only minor.
Comparing panels (a) and (b) one observes that productivity after T periods is
larger for γ = 0.25 than for γ = 0.75. At first sight this is rather surprising since a
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larger number of spinoffs means that a larger amount of venture capital has flown into
the industry which should increase total revenues and accordingly total expenditures for
innovation. On the other hand, the strategic analysis in Colombo and Dawid (2006)
suggest that increased availability of venture capital reduces incentives for firms to
invest in innovative activities. Before we explore this type of explanation we have to
verify that the observation in these two single runs corresponds to a robust general
effect. In table 1 we give the median values over 50 runs of the average productivity
in the industry after T periods for values of γ ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}5. It can be seen
γ 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
A(T ) 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.4
Table 1: Median values of average productivity in the industry after T periods for
β = η = 0.
that for small γ average productivity A(T ) is decreasing for increasing γ but becomes
virtually constant in the region of high availability of venture capital. Although the
differences in the median are small, the difference in the A(T ) values between runs
with γ = 0 and such with γ = 1 is statistically significant at a 95% level. To check
whether the negative effect of availability of venture capital on productivity is indeed
due to the reduced incentives to invest in innovation, we give in figure 3 the average
expenditures per capital unit in the industry for innovation and imitation. Indeed, it
can be clearly seen that as γ goes up firms shift their activities more towards imitation
and reduce their expenditures for innovation. Again, this phenomenon disappears as γ
becomes large. This might be due to the fact that for large values of γ almost every
radical innovation results in the generation of a spinoff. Under the assumption that no
potential spinoff founder will be kept in the firm by bonus payments the actual value
of γ does no longer influence the payoff of the incumbent firm and therefore also not
its incentives to invest in innovative activities. These observations match very well the
findings concerning innovation incentives in Colombo and Dawid (2006). In that respect
it should be noted that contrary to Colombo and Dawid (2006) in our settings firms do
not act strategically and do not build estimations about future returns on investment.
Nevertheless, the relevant strategic aspects are captured in this evolutionary model
with simple reinforcement-type learning behavior of firms.
In figure 4(a) it can be seen that average firm profits decrease for increasing values
of γ. The strong effect of γ on industry concentration (figure 4(b)) suggests that the
negative effect of γ on average productivity is not the main driver of this phenomenon,
but rather the increased competition due to the larger number of spinoff firms.
3.3 The Impact of Learning Curve Effects
Learning curve effects imply comparative cost advantages of incumbents compared to
spinoff firms. Accordingly, one could expect that incentives to form spinoffs are reduced
even if venture capital is readily available and the negative effect of γ on the innovation
5For the extreme case γ = 1 spinoff founders obtain venture capital without any sharing of profits.
Obviously this is not a realistic scenario and should be considered as a theoretical benchmark.
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Figure 3: Average innovation expenditures (a) and imitation expenditures (b) per unit
of capital for β = η = 0.
incentives are smaller than in the baseline case. It turns out that quite the opposite
is true. In figure 5 we compare innovation and imitation expenditures depending on γ
for η = 0, 0.05, 0.1 and β = 0. It can be clearly seen that the negative effect of γ on
innovation expenditures becomes stronger if there are positive learning curve effects.
A possible explanation for this pattern is that the bonus firms have to pay in order to
prevent the formation of a spinoff after a radical innovation does not only depend on
the potential profits of the spinoffs but also on the expected losses by the incumbent.
Given that incumbents on average have lower per unit costs the stronger the learning
curve effects, strong learning curve effects imply that the negative impact on profits
of the productivity losses implied by a spinoff formation is strong. Accordingly, the
larger η is, the higher are the bonus payments needed to prevent spinoff formation.
This effect increases the incentives of firms to acquire the technology by subsequent
imitation rather than preventing the spinoff from forming and we obtain a shift of
expenditures towards imitative activities. This shift becomes stronger the more likely
it is that spinoffs form. For η = 0.1 and γ = 1 firms on average spend three times as
much for imitation than for innovation.
The impact of positive learning curve effects on productivity, profits and industry
concentration is now quite obvious (figure 6). As has to be expected increasing learning
curve effects yield an upward shift of the lines indicating average profits and industry
concentration. This induces an increase in average expenditures for innovation and
imitation and therefore also average productivity goes up. With respect to the impact
of changes in the availability of venture capital we observe that the addition of learning
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Figure 4: Average firm profits (a) and industry concentration (b) at period T for
β = η = 0.
curve effects does not qualitatively alter the observations made in the baseline case but
rather reinforces these phenomena. Productivity, profits and industry concentration
decrease if the γ goes up.
3.4 The Impact of Technological Spillovers
If there are technological spillovers within a cluster firms profit from innovative activ-
ities of the other enterprises in the cluster. Taking this externality into account, the
formation of a spinoff has an inter-temporal positive effect for the incumbent in addition
to the negative effects due to current knowledge losses and increased competition.
We study the impact of this positive inter-temporal effect by comparing the baseline
case with scenarios where the spillover parameter is increased to β = 0.2 and β = 0.4
but no learning curve effects are present. As can be seen in figure 7 the presence of
technological spillovers indeed substantially changes the impact of availability of venture
capital on the balance between innovation and imitation expenditures. We now observe
that expenditures for innovation increase whereas expenditures for imitation decrease as
γ goes up. For β = 0.4 and γ = 1 firms spend almost twice as much for innovation as for
imitation. Due to the spillovers firms in large clusters on average have to spend less own
funds in order to generate a successful innovation. Therefore the return on investment
for innovation in large cluster is comparatively large and firms shift expenditures from
imitation to innovation.
The shift of expenditures towards innovative activities improves the speed of tech-
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Figure 5: Average innovation expenditures Xin(T ) and imitation expenditures Xim(T )
per unit of capital for η = 0 (solid line), η = 0.05 (dashed line) and η = 0.1 (dotted
line); β = 0.
nological change. Figure 8 shows that with positive technological spillovers an increase
in the availability of venture capital has a positive impact on the average productiv-
ity. This does not translate into a positive impact of γ on average firm profits due to
decreased industry concentration and increased intensity of competition induced by an
increase in γ. In particular, for large values of γ the industry reaches a significantly
higher productivity than in the baseline case but average firm profits for β = 0.4 are
less than 50% compared to the case where β = 0. The main reason for this observation
is that with spillovers more (radical) innovations are developed and more spinoffs are
founded. Accordingly, industry concentration is smaller in the presence of spillovers
and this has effects on profits. Introspection of individual simulation runs shows that
although the final concentration of the industry is rather small for large values of γ,
typically a dominant cluster emerges and all firms that end up with a significant market
share are members of this cluster. Also firms that are founded relatively late in the
dominant cluster may become one of the leading producers. This is quite in contrast to
the scenarios with learning curve effects and no spillovers, where introspection of single
runs shows that the industry is typically dominated by incumbents and early spinoffs.
Although the focus of this analysis is on the evolution of productivity, industry
structure and firms’ innovation strategies, at this point we should briefly discuss con-
sumer surplus. If we consider total industry output in dependence of the parameter
γ, we observe a strong positive relationship. This is the result of increasing average
productivity and increasing intensity of competition. Accordingly, the price of the
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Figure 6: Average productivity (a), average profits (b) and industry concentration (c)
after T periods for η = 0 (solid line), η = 0.05 (dashed line) and η = 0.1 (dotted line);
β = 0.
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Figure 7: Average innovation expenditures Xin(T ) and imitation expenditures Xim(T )
per unit of capital for β = 0 (solid line), β = 0.2 (dashed line) and β = 0.4 (dotted
line); η = 0.
consumption good decreases as γ increases. This means that improved availability of
venture capital decreases average firm profits but improves the speed of technological
change and consumer surplus.
3.5 The Interplay of Learning Curve Effects and Technological Spillovers
In the previous subsections we have seen that the qualitative impact of an increase
of γ on expenditures for innovation and on the speed of technological change alters
significantly depending on whether technological spillovers and learning curve effects are
present or not. On the other hand, the effect of an increase in γ on profits and industry
concentration was always negative. Given these findings we should expect a negative
impact of γ on these two variables also if both effects are simultaneously present.
Furthermore, it is quite clear that in such a case the dependency of average productivity
and average innovation expenditures on γ will in general depend on the relative strength
of the two effects and can be non-monotonous. In particular, there might be an interior
value of γ that maximizes the speed of technological change in an industry. To illustrate
this point we show in figure 9 the dependence of average productivity and average
innovation expenditures on γ for the parameter setting β = 0.2, η = 0.05.
Although the strategic effect is large enough to generate a negative relationship be-
tween γ and innovation expenditures, the additional knowledge externalities generated
by increased spinoff formations are sufficiently strong such that average productivity
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Figure 8: Average productivity (a), average profits (b) and industry concentration (c)
after T periods for for β = 0 (solid line), β = 0.2 (dashed line) and β = 0.4 (dotted
line); η = 0.
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Figure 9: Average productivity (a) and average innovation expenditures after T periods
for η = 0.05 and β = 0.2.
is increasing with γ for small values of that parameter. Also in this case the difference
in average productivity between runs with γ = 0 and such with γ = 1 is statistically
significant. The highest median of average productivity values is reached for γ = 0.5.
Accordingly, in such a scenario there can be both too much venture capital and too
little venture capital. More substantial statements could only be made with particular
industries in mind where the relative strength of the two considered effects could be
estimated. Such an exercise is beyond the scope of this paper.
4 Conclusions
The agenda of this paper is to gain a better understanding of the interplay of different
effects generated by easy availability of venture capital on the speed of technological
change and the evolution of an industry. The two main effects under consideration are
a positive direct effect (VC facilitates the emergence of industrial clusters and therefore
generates positive externalities through local technological spillovers) and a negative
incentive effect (VC improves the outside option of potential spinoff founders which
reduces the expected return on R&D investments for incumbents).
Based on the results of our industry simulations we can conclude that it depends
crucially on the characteristics of the considered industry which of these two effects
dominates. In particular, if there are no knowledge flows between spinoffs and their
parent companies after the spinoffs have been found, the effect of the additional in-
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novation expenditures funded by the capital flowing into the industry is outweighed
by the downward adaptation of innovation intensities by the incumbent firms. Eas-
ier access to venture capital by potential spinoff founders induces slower growth of the
average productivity in the industry. Presence of learning curve effects or other compar-
ative advantages for incumbents reinforce this phenomenon since prevention of spinoff
formation becomes very costly and the focus of incumbents shifts towards imitative
activities. If there are sufficiently strong technological spillovers between parents and
spinoffs after spinoff formation, the negative relationship between innovation intensity
and venture capital availability disappears. Based on past experience firms anticipate
future positive effects of an increase in their cluster due to spinoff formation and these
effects outweigh the reduced appropriability due to thicker venture capital markets.
If spillover effects are not so strong, innovation intensities go down as venture capital
markets become thicker but due to increased knowledge externalities average industry
productivity still goes up.
The approach in this paper is a theoretical one and we do not intend to capture the
structure of any particular industry with the considered model6, but rather are inter-
ested in obtaining general insights. Nevertheless, our findings yield testable conjectures
about the relationship between venture capital investments, number of spinoffs, innova-
tion intensity and productivity growth in different types of industries. We will attempt
to empirically test these conjectures in future work.
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